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UNITED STATES V. LARA,
124 S. Ct. 1628 (2004)
Introduction
The Interstate Commerce Clause (Commerce Clause) grants the
federal government authority, superior to any state claims, to regulate
commerce with the Indian tribes.' The Commerce Clause was enacted
partially in response to the confusion surrounding the multitude of individual
treaties between Indian tribes (tribes) and the federal government.2 In 1790,
Congress extended its power over the tribes, again to the exclusion of the
states with the Indian Nonintercourse Act which reserved the right to acquire
Indian lands to the federal government.
3
The legal relationship between the tribes and the federal government
has since been augmented by Congress, the executive branch, the courts, and
the tribes themselves.4 Several principles have been articulated to legitimate
the federal government powers: Congress exercises plenary power over
Indian affairs; Indian tribes still retain sovereign but diminished inherent
powers over their internal affairs and reservation territory; and the United
States possesses a trust responsibility toward the tribes.5 These principles
derive from the "Marshall trilogy," and have structured the debate that
pervades modern Indian law and policy.
6
The Marshall trilogy, consisting of John Marshall's decisions in
Johnson v. M'Intosh,7 Cherokee v. Georgia,8 and Worcester v. Georgia,9
I U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power To... regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes").
2 DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 83, 326 (3d ed.
1993).
3 Doug Nash, Indian Lands: Nonintercourse Acts, at
http://profs.lp.findlaw.com/ilands/ilands_2.html.
GETCHES, supra note 2, at 83.
5 GETCHES, supra note 2, at 84.
6 GETCHES, supra note 2, at 84.
7 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) (finding that Indians did not have title to land
because they never actually owned it). In Johnson, the plaintiffs, mostly British citizens and their heirs,
claimed title to property conveyed to them by the Piankeshaw Indians prior to the American Revolution.
Id. at 571. The plaintiffs contended that their title ran directly from the Native Americans who owned the
property and therefore it was superior to defendants' title. Id. The defendants' land grant came directly
from the United States government and the district court held that defendants' claim was superior. Id. at
604. The court based this decision on the idea that the Piankeshaw were not actually able to convey the
land because they never "owned" it in the traditional sense of the word. Id. at 595-96. The Supreme
Court of the United States agreed and upheld the defendants' title by land grant. Id. at 604-05.
8 Cherokee v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831) (deciding that the Cherokee nation was not a foreign
nation for constitutional purposes). In Cherokee, the plaintiffs filed a motion on behalf of the Cherokee
nation for an injunction to restrain the state of Georgia from executing and enforcing its laws within the
Cherokee territory, as designated by treaty between the United States and the Cherokee nation. Id. at 15.
The Cherokee nation argued that it was a distinct state, capable of managing its own affairs and governing
itself. Id. at 16. The nation also argued that it was not a state of the union and insisted that individually
they were aliens, not owing any allegiance to the United States government. Id. The Court held that U.S.
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advanced the idea that federal sower over Indian affairs stems from
protective obligations to the tribes.' In Johnson, this notion of the tribes as a
protectorate positioned the United States as the overseer to the land early
Europeans had "discovered."" The Marshall trilogy extended the paternal
implication of the discovery doctrines to mean that the government had an
inherent duty to ensure the sovereignty and independence of the Indian tribes
by protecting them from outsiders, including the states.'2  The Supreme
Court of the United States has stretched the concept of a protective duty to an
almost unbridled power over the tribes.' 3 Previously the Court had identified
the Treaty Clause, 4 the War Power, 15 and the Property Clause 6 as sources of
legislative and executive authority to regulate Indian affairs.' 7  Today the
federal power over Indian affairs is traced primarily to the Indian Commerce
Clause as the only express grant of power over the Indians.'
8
FACTS
Billy Jo Lara, a member of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa
Indians, married a woman from the Spirit Lake Tribe of Sioux Indians
(Tribe) and lived on the latter's reservation with his family.' 9 Despite the
marital bond, Lara was not considered a member of the Tribe.2° After
several incidents of misconduct, the Tribe issued an order excluding Lara
CONST. art. I, § 8, which empowered Congress to regulate commerce, specifically treated the Cherokee
nation as distinct from a foreign nation. Id. at 18-19. Nevertheless, the Court found that an Indian tribe or
nation within the United States was not a foreign state within the meaning of the Constitution. Id. at 20.
9 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832) (finding unconstitutional a Georgia law which
prevented whites from living on Indian land). The Cherokee nation entered into treaties with the United
States that guaranteed Indian lands for Indians. Id. at 554-56. A congressional act to promote the
civilization of Indian tribes, this authorized the President to appoint persons to minister and educate
Indians. Id. at 557. However, one Georgia law prohibited white persons from living on Cherokee land
without a license and another law redrew the boundaries of Cherokee territory. Id. at 542. Georgia
authorities arrested Worcester, who lived on Cherokee land as part of his appointment to educate and
minister to them, and the trial court convicted him. Id. at 540. Worcester sought review in the Supreme
Court of the United States by writ of error. Id. a 536-37. The Court reversed and annulled the judgment.
Id. at 562. The Court held that Georgia's laws were repugnant to present treaties and federal laws. Id. at
540-41.
10 GETCHES, supra note 2, at 84.
I1 /d. at 325.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
15 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11.
16 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
17 GETcHES, supra note 2, at 325.
18 Id. at 326.
19 United States v. Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628, 1631 (2004).
20 Id. at 1632.
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from the reservation. 2 ! Lara ignored the order, striking an officer in his
22attempt to gain access to the reservation.
The Tribe subsequently prosecuted Lara for "violence to a
policeman."23 Lara pleaded guilty and served 90 days in jail.24 After Lara
served his sentence, the United States government charged him in federal
court for assaulting an officer, a federal crime.25
The elements of the federal crime are similar to those of the tribal
charge, which ordinarily would have brought Lara within the protections of
the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause.26 Before a Magistrate
Judge in the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota,
however, the government argued that Indian tribes only act as separate
sovereigns when they prosecute their own members, and, thus, double
jeopardy did not apply.2 Although the government acknowledged that the
Supreme Court of the United States had held that a tribe no longer possessed
inherent or sovereign authority to prosecute nonmember Indians,28 the
government argued that the newly amended statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1302,
specifically authorized tribes to prosecute Indian members of different
tribes.29 The government argued that the statute did not delegate the federal
government's own powers, but enlarged the tribes' inherent powers of self-
government.
30
The Magistrate and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit accepted the government's claim, rejecting Lara's double
jeopardy defense. 31 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed, however, holding that the Tribe had exercised delegated federal
32prosecutorial power. As a result, the concept of dual sovereignty did not
apply, and the Double Jeopardy Clause barred a second prosecution.33 The




25 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 111 (2002)).
26 Id. ("nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb; ...")
27 Id. at 1632.
25 Id. (citing Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990)).
29 Id. (citing Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 201(2), as amended, 25 U.S.C. § 1301 et. seq.
(2004))("'[P]owers of self-government' means and includes all governmental powers possessed by an
Indian tribe, executive, legislative, and judicial, and all offices, bodies, and tribunals by and through
which they are executed, including courts of Indian offenses; and means the inherent power of Indian
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Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to address the
differences in interpretations of the amended statute.34
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of the United States held that the source of the
Tribe's power to prosecute and punish the defendant for violence to a
policeman was inherent tribal authority rather than delegated federal
authority. 35 The Court further held that Congress possessed constitutional
power to lift or relax restrictions on Indian tribes' criminal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians that were previously imposed by political branches of
government.36 Finally, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause could
not bar a federal prosecution of the defendant, following the Tribe's
prosecution, absent a showing that the source of the tribal prosecution was
federal power.37
ANALYSIS
Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, began his analysis with a
brief discussion of 25 U.S.C. § 1301 and its legislative history.38 The Court
focused on the statutory language, "recognize[s] and affirm[s]," as evidence
the amendment was restoring inherent tribal power and not establishing an
entirely new source of authority.39 The Court found that Congress itself also
provided insight into its intent.4° The legislative history is replete with
statements approving such concepts as "this legislation is not a delegation of
this jurisdiction but clarification," and "the premise is that the Congress
affirms the inherent jurisdiction of tribal governments over nonmember
Indians.",41 The Court determined that both sources indicate that the statute
sought to adjust the tribes' status.42
Further, in rejecting Lara's attempt to show that Congress did not
possess the ability to alter the tribes' status, the Court concluded that
Congress derived its power from 1) the Indian Commerce Clause 43 and the
34 Id.
35 Id. at 1639.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 1632-33.
39 Id. at 1632.
40 Id. at 1633.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 1633 (citing U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.) ("The Congress shall have Power .... To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes... ").
[Vol. 11:291
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Treaty Clause;44  2) the Constitution's "plenary" grants of power;45 3)
previous examples of congressional adjustments to similarly situated
entities;46 4) the lack of constitutional language to the contrary;47 5) the fact
that the change at issue was a limited one; 48 and 6) the Court's notion that its
holding was consistent with established precedent.49
Simply stated, the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause
"is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian
affairs." 50 Congressional powers stemming from the Treaty Clause are less
clear.5 ' While the Treaty Clause derives from Article II, applies to the
executive branch, and does not authorize Congress to act legislatively,
treaties can authorize Congress to deal with matters it otherwise could not
address.52  The Court stated that the Commerce Clause "in no way affects
Congress' plenary powers to legislate on problems of Indians," 53 despite the
fact that Congress ended the practice of entering into treaties with the tribes
in 187 1.54 In addition, the Court noted Indian affairs were more an aspect of
military and foreign policy and thus the power to legislate them does not
come within any affirmative grant of constitutional power, but rather those
powers described as "necessary concomitant of nationality. ,
55
The Court had held the Indian Commerce Clause permitted Congress
to both restrict and ease restrictions on tribes.56 Recognizing that the tribes
were of diverse cultures, living on billions of acres of land, the Court
reasoned that Congress would need to have this flexibility and had in fact
used it on numerous occasions to address the changing needs of the United
States and the tribes.57 Further, the statutory goal of modifying the degree of
44 Id. at 1634 (citing U.S. CONST., art. 11, § 2, cl. 2) ("[The President] shall have Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of
the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments").
45 Id. at 1634.
46 Id. at 1635 (citing Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 209-10 (1903)).
47 Id. at 1635-36.
48 Id. at 1636.
49 Id. at 1636-37 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Oliphant v. Suquamish,
435 U.S. 191 (1978); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990)).
50 Id. at 1633 (quoting Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989)).
51 Id. at 1633-34.
52 Id. at 1628, 1633-34 (citing Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920)).
53 Id. at 1634 (quoting Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 203 (1975)).
5 Id. (stating that tribes are not entities "with whom the United States may contract by treaty"
(citing 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1871))).
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autonomy dependent sovereigns enjoyed was not an unusual objective.
58
The modification was only a limited alteration, not an effort to legislate
radical changes or interfere with State power or authority.59 Supreme Court
precedent has held that the power to prosecute nonmembers was an aspect of
tribes' external relations and hence part of the tribal sovereignty divested by
treaties and by Congress. 6° The Court has never held that Congress could not
modify or adjust the tribes' status.
6'
There is no explicit language in the Constitution suggesting a
limitation on Congress' authority to relax the restrictions on tribal
62sovereigns. Despite the Court's previous ruling in United States v.
Wheeler 63 that the power to prosecute nonmembers was an aspect of the
tribes' external relations and hence part of the tribal sovereignty that was
divested by treaties and by Congress, Oliphant v. Suquamish64 and Duro v.
Reina65 made clear that the Constitution does not dictate the bounds of tribal
58 Id. at 1635.
59 Id. at 1635-36.
60 See generally United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Oliphant v. Suquamish, 435 U.S.
191 (1978); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
61 Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1636.
62 Id. at 1635.
6 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (finding that a prosecution for a crime in a
tribal court did not preclude prosecution in federal court under the double jeopardy clause). In Wheeler,
the respondent, a Navajo Tribe member, was charged with statutory rape in a federal court. Id. at 315. He
filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that because he had earlier been convicted by a tribal court of a lesser
included offense, the double jeopardy clause barred the federal prosecution. Id. at 315-16. The district
court granted his motion and dismissed the indictment. Id. at 316. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed. Id. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, however, holding that the source
of the power to punish tribal offenders was the inherent power of a limited sovereignty that had never
been extinguished, and not a delegation to the tribe of federal authority. Id. at 321, 323-24. Thus, when
the Navajo Tribe criminally punished a member, it acted as an independent sovereign, not as an arm of the
federal government. Id. at 329-30. Therefore, where tribal and federal prosecutions were brought by
separate sovereigns, they were not "for the same offence," and the double jeopardy clause did not bar the
federal prosecution. Id.
64 Oliphant v. Suquamish, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (determining that tribal courts do not have
inherent authority to punish non-Indians). In Oliphant, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit denied the petitioner's request for habeas relief and held that respondent Suquamish Indian Tribe
had criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians because it retained those powers of autonomous states that
were neither inconsistent with its status nor expressly terminated by Congress. Id. at 194-95. The
Supreme Court of the United States noted that by acknowledging their dependence on the United States in
the Treaty of Point Elliott the Suquamish recognized that the federal government would arrest and try
non-Indian intruders who came within their reservation. Id. at 207. Moreover, the Court held that Indians
did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians absent affirmative delegation of such power by
Congress. Id. at 208. Although Indian tribes retained elements of "quasi-sovereign" authority after
ceding their lands to the federal government and announcing their dependence on the federal government,
the tribes' retained powers were not such that they were limited only by specific restrictions in treaties or
congressional enactments. Id. Rather, Indian tribes were prohibited from exercising both those powers of
autonomous states that were expressly terminated by Congress and those powers "inconsistent with their
status." Id.
6 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (finding that an Indian tribe cannot maintain criminal
jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian). In Duro, at issue was whether the Salt River Pima-Maricopa
Indian Community could assert criminal jurisdiction over the defendant, who was an Indian but not a
United States v. Lara
66autonomy. In addition, historic practice, expert opinion, modem tribal
courts, and published opinions of the Solicitor of the Department of the
Interior were all consulted as authorities. 67  The Court did not consider
whether a statute could constitutionally remove restrictions on the tribes'
inherent authority.68  Consequently, the Court did not read Wheeler,
Oliphant, or Duro as holding that the Constitution forbids Congress to
change federal Indian law through this type of legislation. 69  The Court
conclusively decided that these cases were not determinative because
Congress enacted an amendment to the statute.7°
In recognizing that Congress had the power to relax restrictions on
the tribes' authority,7' the Court noted that Lara failed the first step necessary
to prove his constitutional argument.72 It necessarily followed that he could
not prove the three remaining steps, and thus Lara was not protected by the
double jeopardy clause. 7
Lara focused his appeal largely on an argument claiming Congress
had overreached its legislative authority.74 The Court noted that in order for
this "lack of constitutional power" claim to succeed, Lara had to show that
Congress did not possess the constitutional power to enact a statute that
modifies tribal power, such that the word "inherent" in the statute's phrase
"inherent power" was void.75 In addition, Lara was required to show that the
word "inherent" was severable from the statute and that the remainder of the
statute was valid without the word.76 Such a showing would signify that the
Tribe's prosecution was federal, by way of delegation, and hence the Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibited the second prosecution.
member of the Pima-Maricopa tribe. Id. at 679. The defendant stood trial after he allegedly committed a
murder within the boundaries of the reservation. Id. at 679, 681. After the tribal court denied his motion
to dismiss the prosecution for lack of jurisdiction, the defendant filed a petition for habeas corpus in the
district court. Id. at 681-82. The district court granted the writ, but the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed. Id. at 682. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the tribe's
retained sovereignty did not include the authority to impose criminal sanctions against a citizen outside its
own membership. Id. at 679. The Court concluded that if the present jurisdictional scheme proved
insufficient to meet the practical needs of reservation law enforcement, then the proper body to address
the problem was the United States Congress, which had the ultimate authority over Indian affairs. Id. at
698. The Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. Id.





71 Id. at 1632-33.
72 Id. at 1638.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 1632-33.
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Lara made several secondary arguments in an effort to bolster his
case.78 Lara's claim of denial of equal protection argument focused on
Congress' use of the language, "all Indians," in the phrase "inherent power..
to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians. 79 Lara claimed the
language was race-based and without justification.80 In addressing this
argument, the Court decided that even if the language was race-based, the
entire argument was beside the point.8' At best, this showed not that Lara's
first conviction was federal, but that it was constitutionally defective.82 That,
however, would not further Lara's double jeopardy claim.
83
Lara further argued that the Due Process Clause forbids Congress to
permit a tribe to prosecute a nonmember.84 Considering this argument, the
Court noted that even if it was valid and showed that any prosecution of a
nonmember was void, this would not prove that the source of the tribal
prosecution was federal power.85 Therefore, Lara could not win his double
jeopardy claim.
86
Lara's last argument claimed that the lack of constitutional
procedural guarantees, such as the right to counsel, was an important reason
for concluding that the tribes did not have "inherent power" pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1302.87 This argument also failed to impress the Court.88 The
Court replied that the argument simply repeated both his due process and the
equal protection arguments. 89 As such, the problem Lara identified would
still exist whether the Court interpreted the statute as delegating federal
power or not.90 As a result, that argument did not assist Lara any more than
the others did.9'
In reversing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the majority
concluded that Congress exercised constitutionally provided powers when it
permitted tribes, as an application of their inherent tribal authority, to
prosecute nonmembers.92 The Tribe was acting as an independent sovereign,
rather than as an arm of the federal government.93 Consequently, the Double
78 Id. at 1637-39.








87 Id. at 1638-39.
98 ld.
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Jeopardy Clause did not prohibit the federal government from proceeding
with its prosecution. 94
CONCURRING OPINIONS
Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and Thomas filed concurring opinions.95
Justice Stevens noted that Indian tribes had governed territory long before
Columbus arrived.96 In contrast, the States had never been independent
sovereigns.97 Yet in years past, Congress had expanded the states' powers to
include those the Constitution prohibited.98 Since Congress has expanded
the states' powers to include those they could not previously exercise, it is
unexceptional that Congress could a fortiori also relax restrictions on powers
that had existed earlier. 99
Justice Kennedy stated that Congress demonstrated a clear intent to
restore, not delegate, powers to the tribes and, consequently, Lara's double
jeopardy argument must fail. 1' ° Although he agreed with the majority's
conclusion, Justice Kennedy did not believe it was necessary for the Court to
delve into the Constitution to create its justification.'0 1 Indeed, he thought a
pronouncement that Congress can subject a citizen to a sovereignty outside
the basic structure of the Constitution was a serious step. 10 2 Acknowledging
a historical exception for Indian tribes to govern the relations among their
own members, Justice Kennedy believed the exception was limited to the
extent that a member of a tribe consents to be subjected to the jurisdiction of
his tribe.0 3
Justice Kennedy also noted that the individual citizen has an
enforceable right to those structural guarantees of liberty provided for in the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, a right which he felt the majority
ignored.1°4 He concluded that perhaps the Court's holding could be justified
by an argument that by enrolling in one tribe, Lara consented to the criminal
94 Id.
95 Id. at 1639, 1641.





101 Id. at 1640-41(arguing that a proper approach would be to take Congress at its word when it
stated that its intention of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 was to restore to the tribes, based on a
theory of inherent sovereign power, and not on delegation).
102 Id. at 1640.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 1641.
20051
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jurisdiction of other tribes but noted that the Court did not take up that
point. 105
Justice Thomas concurred with the majority, despite believing that
the Court should reexamine the premises and logic upon which tribal
sovereignty has been built.' °6 He noted that the confusion reflected in Court
precedent arose from two largely incompatible assumptions: 1) Congress
can regulate virtually every aspect of the tribes without rendering tribal
sovereignty a nullity; and 2) the Indian tribes somehow retained inherent
sovereignty to enforce their criminal laws against their own members. 10 7 He
concluded that these conflicting observations were the result of the Court's
failure to adequately analyze the Constitution. 108
Justice Thomas further rejected the Court's resort to a recitation of
past examples concerning congressional assertions of its constitutional
plenary power.1°9 He stated that the Court's analysis failed for two reasons:
1) Congress cannot simultaneously claim the power to regulate the tribes
through ordinary domestic legislation and also maintain that the tribes are
sovereign; and 2) the Court's examples of instances where Congress
exercised its power to alter the status of United States territories are not on
point; Congress has plenary power to govern territories and the Court itself
has held that the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to the territories. 110
Furthermore, Justice Thomas opined that the 1871 legislation
terminating the practice of dealing with the tribes by treaty should have been
given more weight.1" He concluded by stating that although the issue of
double jeopardy has constitutional implications, it does not follow that the
Court's federal-common-law decisions regarding the tribes' inherent
authority had become enshrined as constitutional holdings that Congress
could not change.'12
DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented, arguing that the
Court's precedent holds that any tribal exercise of criminal jurisdiction over
105 Id.




110 Id. at 1648.
III Id. at 1642.
112 Id.
300 [Vol. 11:291
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nonmembers necessarily rests on a delegation of federal power."
3
Consequently, it is not similar to a congressional permit to the States to
exercise some authority it would otherwise be barred from wielding.
14
Thus, the power Congress has given to the tribes in its amendment to the
1968 Indian Civil Rights Act was more akin to the delegation of lawmaking
powers to an administrative agency.15
Justices Souter and Scalia argued that the application of the double
jeopardy doctrine of dual sovereignty turned on the question of how far a
prosecuting entity's inherent jurisdiction extended.1 6 They reasoned there
were only two ways inherent sovereignty could be restored so as to alter
application of the dual sovereignty rule: 1) Congress could grant the same
independence to the tribes that it did to territories; or 2) the Court could
repudiate its existing doctrine of dependent sovereignty. "17
Justices Souter and Scalia concluded that the Court should maintain
its reliance on stare decisis."8  Court precedent, they argued, provided
compelling principles, useful in times of confusion. 19 The Justices stated
Duro and Oliphant should be upheld and that Congress could not control the
interpretation of a statute in a way that is at odds with the constitutional
consequences of the tribes' continuing dependent status.
20
CONCLUSION
The Court's decision could have significant implications for Native
Americans. Effectively, for any crime for which a tribe can arrest and punish
an Indian, the federal government can administer similar treatment. In day-
to-day situations, the concept of dual sovereignty may be necessary for
efficient tribal governance. In fact, tribal independence may be justifiable
considering the manner in which the United States government has
sabotaged the Native Americans' existence. However, if operation as a
separate sovereign works to negate constitutional protections afforded to
every other American citizen, its value is trivialized.
13 Id. at 1649 (citing Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990)) ( "[B]ecause tribes have lost their
inherent criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, any subsequent exercise of such jurisdiction
could only have come to the Tribe by delegation from Congress').
114 Id.
115 Id.




120 Id. at 1651.
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Considering that Native Americans are arrested at twice the rate for
alcohol- related crimes than any other race, 121 there are 44% more American
Indians under correctional control than the national rate, 22 and the United
States Attorney's Office brought over one thousand cases against Native
Americans, 23 there is a real possibility that Native Americans will serve
significantly more time in prison as a result of being prohibited from
claiming a double jeopardy defense. Native Americans already comprise
about five percent (5%) of the prison population, an overrepresentation for a
group that makes up less than one percent (1%) of the United States
population. 1
24
This decision maintains the perspective that the Native American
tribes have long governed themselves. However, this application of
sovereign authority punishes the individual for benefits that the group
receives. In order for the tribes to be sovereign authorities, they must agree
to have their members subject to two sets of laws. But because of their
overlapping nature, the tribal laws cannot protect the alleged criminal from
the federal laws, and neither can the federal laws protect the alleged criminal
from the tribal laws. An agreement between tribal governments and the
federal government on jurisdiction seems more reasonable. As a solution, if
the crime is committed on a reservation, the tribe has the first right of refusal
to prosecute. If the tribe refuses to prosecute, the federal government may
then choose to do so. However, if the crime is committed off a reservation,
then the federal government has automatic jurisdiction. If the federal
government chooses not to prosecute, then the tribe may prosecute, if
possible. This operates to protect both the alleged criminal and the victim,
whether or not they are both Native American.
No justifiable reason exists to punish an Indian twice for a crime for
which any other citizen would have been punished only once. Having both
bodies of law operating simultaneously sets Native Americans apart as a
separate class of citizens. This is discriminatory. Regardless of its powers to
relax and restrict tribal sovereign authority, Congress should not be permitted
to violate constitutionally based equal protection guarantees.
Summary and Analysis Prepared By:
Yanessa Barnard
12! Marika F. X. Litras, Bureau of Justice Statistics: Tribal Justice Statistics Collection Efforts, at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/programs/conferences/2001/statistics.pdf (last visited Nov. 09, 2004).
122 Id. (reporting 4,193 cases against Native Americans compared to the national rate of 2,907).
123 Id.
124 Dr. Tom O'Connor, Sociology of Discrimination: Discrimination Against Native Americans -
Criminal Justice Discrimination, available at http://faculty.ncwc.edu/toconnor/soc/355Iectl2.htm (last
modified Jan. 06, 2004).
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